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I. INTRODUCTION
The negotiating stance of the United States in the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (MTN) was derived largely from a concerted
effort to increase our export potential, and particularly, our ac-
cess to markets. Our negotiators properly fought hard to "get"
more than we "gave." This aggressive position was productive,
but one result was the "benign neglect" of those aspects of trade
which speak to reduction of our barriers to the exports of other
nations. In fact, protectionist pressures unleashed by the eco-
nomic difficulties of the past several years raise the serious threat
that the implementing legislation will be dominated by measures
with the sole effect of increasing harassment of trade and adding
significantly to consumer prices. If the Administration has
"bought" its way to world agreement and to Congressional ap-
proval with a number of "side deals," secret agreements and
promises to protectionist forces, the problems and costs of trading
may be exacerbated, and the health of the international economy
endangered despite the gains achieved in Geneva.
Will the U.S. importing community oppose the final Tokyo
Round package? Importers wonder whether the overall results of
the MTN will in fact be trade liberalizing. They ask whether the
price that has been paid to obtain approval of the MTN package is
too high. The question becomes-will the agreements, implement-
ing legislation and application of the agreements offer sufficient
benefit to international trade to overcome the price; or is the
alternative- Congressional disapproval-so unacceptable that im-
porters must support the package regardless of the price paid?
Nothing in the package is vital for importers. Even the agree-
ments on valuation and tariff cuts are of less than absolute impor-
tance to them. More serious are the ramifications of rejection of
the package. Brushfire trade wars are a more likely result than
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threats of a world wide trade war and a severe economic depres-
sion but any such projections are too speculative to form the basis
for a decision to support or reject the President's ultimate legisla-
tive package. That decision more properly will be based on the
merits of the package itself.
A major reason why the import community has delayed any
decision on the package is the procedure adopted by Congress for
its consideration.' The Trade Act of 1974 calls for submission of
the agreements, implementing legislation, and statements of ad-
ministrative intent for Congressional consideration without
amendment and under short time constraints. The legislative in-
tent was to force a vote on the negotiated results with minimal
threat to commitments made at the bargaining table. However,
the process has had other, less salutary, results. Because the
President decided to invoke the ninety-day pre-submission con-
sultation period before the negotiations had been completed,
Congress and the Administration drafted the corresponding
amendments to domestic law without meaningful public participa-
tion. The hearings held were perfunctory and limited in scope.
The public was forced to comment on draft agreements still sub-
ject to confidential negotiation and on general descriptions of pro-
posed amendments contained in press releases. No opportunity
was given for comment on the specific language of a bill. Such
language, of course, often determines the acceptability of a con-
cept.
At best, since this is a year of rising protectionist sentiment,
limited access procedures may have allowed the House Ways and
Means and Senate Finance Trade Subcommittees some latitude
for acting in a more restrained and statesmanlike fashion. Never-
theless, the Subcommittees' actions promoted "free trade" only to
the extent that other protectionist proposals were rejected. Cer-
tainly some of the interests most affected by the package were
not provided the opportunity for meaningful input. Importers'
first view of the legislation may not occur until it is presented to
Congress, at which time further amendment is precluded. It will
never really be known whether free trade interests were better
served by this closed process. The exercise clearly was a rever-
sion to the power oriented, "behind closed doors" legislative proc-
ess which Congress normally avoids in today's era of government
in the sunshine. The closed door procedure is even more remark-
' See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
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able when contrasted with the prolonged debate and negotiation
which preceded passage of the Trade Act of 1974. Even with such
extensive public participation, the Trade Act has been found to
contain flaws. Unquestionably, the 1979 Trade Negotiations Im-
plementation Act will need amendment in the future.
II. THE TOKYO ROUND: THE EFFECT ON IMPORTERS
AND THE DIRECTION OF WORLD TRADE
The draft agreements, on first examination, appear softer than
might have been expected. There appear to be more guidelines
than firm rules, an excess of hortatory language, and far too many
provisions excepting certain behavior from those rules that do ex-
ist. However, fundamental change was wrought in the Tokyo
Round. Previously unregulated behavior will be placed within
some scheme of international trade rules or guidelines.2 Govern-
ment procurement and national standard setting are covered for
the first time. A uniform international rule has been proposed for
customs valuation. Government subsidies, the imposition of
countervailing duties, and possibly escape clause proceedings will
have been placed under international regulation and supervision.
In good economic times the agreements allow facilitated trade and
encourage movement toward more rational trade relationships. In
bad economic times, the codes leave the traditional weapons in
place for trade warfare.
The Tokyo Round made other notable beginnings. For the first
time multinational corporations are recognized as presenting dis-
tinctive circumstances and problems. The difficulties in regulating
trade with state controlled economies also are addressed more
fully. In addition, most agreements contain dispute settlement
procedures in recognition of longstanding criticism of GATT's
centralized system.
For the most part the accomplishments and shortcomings of the
The Tokyo Round marks a logical development from the Kennedy Round where the
negotiators were unable to reach agreements on most nontariff barriers. That there was
agreement in the Tokyo Round to restrict a substantial number of trade-distorting activi-
ties is an advance which unfortunately is easily overlooked in the debates over amending
United States law. Rejection of this fundamental, but difficult, advance will do serious, long
term damage to the traditional pro-trade atmosphere throughout the world which may take
decades to repair.
The Tokyo Round will probably be criticized for its failure to address adequately the
problems of the less developed nations; many of these complaints will have merit. The non-
binding guidelines for special treatment in each agreement will not be viewed as solutions
by the LDCs.
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Tokyo Round will have little direct or immediate impact on im-
porters. These negotiations are of far greater importance in terms
of setting the atmosphere for trade in the next decade. Major com-
mercial decisions to expand or retract, to change sources of supply
or to enter new lines will be based partially on the attitudes of na-
tional governments as perceived from their actions in these
negotiations. Even specific government actions under each agree-
ment will not greatly affect importers unless they contribute to a
concerted effort to restrict or encourage trade. To the extent that
importers can now discern governmental policies for the future
from these agreements, the MTN will be a factor in their plan-
ning. For most importers, however, a better guage is the current
policy of those governments. Few business decisions will be based
on the MTN's general rules for dispute settlement, on the para-
meters for imposition of countervailing duties or safeguard
restrictions.
We must be careful not' to demand far reaching visible results
from these agreements. Effects on business as a result of these
changes will be difficult to trace, much less predict. The effects
will be numerous, their impact diffuse and everchanging, and it
will be impossible to isolate single events for study from among
the numerous interacting and unmeasurable forces. Even so rela-
tively simple an event as a duty reduction may lead to complex
responses in trade actualities. Still, certain patterns, as expressed
in the following section, seem clear even now.
III. THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY: THE EFFECT OF THE MTN
AND THE THREAT OF IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION
Traders, and particularly importers, seek stability as a general
rule. Faced with the need to contract for production of their mer-
chandise well into the future-commonly three to eighteen months,
depending on the product-importers place themselves at con-
siderable risk concerning the future state of their selling market.
For that reason they try to sell for future delivery at contract
prices based on their forward purchase obligations. In some
trades this is easy. In consumer goods, for instance, traders are
frequently obliged to guarantee selling prices well into the future,
as in sales to "catalog" retailers. In others, such as prepared
foods, raw materials and some industrial goods, similar guaran-
tees are impossible. Some secondary uncertainties, such as cur-
rency fluctuations, can be dealt with through various price-stabil-
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izing techniques. Other contingencies, such as political changes in
the country of export, cannot be discounted in advance. Further,
in times of long-enduring inflation like the present, both exporter
and importer will set prices at a level which will compensate for
the expected increase in prices; both experience and profit seek-
ing often will lead them to seek over-compensation. It is clear that
for the prudent importer-and this would certainly cover the
largest importers and the greatest part of the volume of trade-
stability in both the producer's market and the importer's own
selling market is desirable. Efforts are constantly underway both
to stabilize markets and to allow for uncontrollable destabilizing
forces.
It is true that some importers seek to take advantage of insta-
bility as a speculative opportunity, that many importers of all
sizes speculate at times, and that many importers (particularly
smaller ones) become speculators out of ignorance. Nevertheless,
these actions almost certainly represent only a minimal volume of
trade, with minimal economic impact. In the long run, for the ma-
jor corporations doing the vast bulk of importation, stability and
the elimination of uncertainty are primary goals and the focus of
both buying and selling activity.
The case of the multinational corporation and the "related" ex-
porter and importer is more difficult to analyze and assess
because price plays more than a market role. Very likely stability
will remain the primary goal, especially in the most monopolistic/
oligopolistic situations where maximization of profit is the object.
Any "commercial" view of the MTN agreements must be based
on an appreciation of the fact that risk and uncertainty are the
main enemies of traders. Essentially, traders are buyers and
sellers. Any business-affecting event that occurs, or may occur, in
the period between commitment to a fixed purchase price and
realization of profit from the sale of that merchandise, is obviously
undesirable. Experience demonstrates clearly that such events
are far more likely to be negative rather than positive; in the case
of government intervention, they will almost invariably be nega-
tive.
Thus, for the trader, the primary impact of the MTN is that
almost all of the codes will reduce areas of risk and uncertainty.
The implementing legislation, however, may exacerbate existing
risks and uncertainties and introduce some new ones. The injury
test in the countervailing duty code, for instance, will be of some
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benefit to trade simply by requiring a showing of injury.' But the
legislation may make the test far too easy to meet. The House
Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade has recommended that
the complainant be required to prove that injury is related to sub-
sidized imports, but that there be no obligation placed on the com-
plainant to prove that injury is not due to any other cause (such as
poor management, antiquated equipment, inefficient methods, or
lack of capital). Others have proposed that our present Antidump-
ing Act' be amended to ease the injury test. Complaints, which
have proliferated since the Trade Act of 1974, can be expected to
increase further in number if these proposals are adopted. Pro-
posed changes in our countervailing duty and antidumping laws
will also permit a court challenge of any determination in the
course of a case (including early termination) by any "interested"
party, such as trade associations or labor unions with affected
members. As a result, risk and uncertainty for the importer will
be increased not only during the period between purchase and
sale, but also beyond the time of sale-perhaps the worst of all
possible outcomes for the importer. Since the importer cannot con-
trol, and normally is not aware of, the export subsidies or home
market values in the country of exportation, this area has always
been a source of surprise and uncertainty. Under the new amend-
ments it will become more so.
The same type of analysis may be applied to the other codes
and their implementing legislation. The valuation code5 estab-
lishes a system which unquestionably will benefit trade, not only
by establishing transaction value as the preferred basis for ap-
praisement, but by establishing specific criteria which must be
met before the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) may move to an
alternate method. For the first time the obligation will be placed
on Customs to defend its reasons for utilizing a value other than
transaction value. A dispute settling mechanism, coupled with
the code's firm espousal of transaction value means that for most
importers dealing at arms length in dutiable goods, the code will
reduce uncertainty and risk. Today, however, much dutiable mer-
chandise enters the United States in "related parties" transac-
tions. It can be expected that with continued growth of multina-
tional and other large corporations and as trade increases with
See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
Antidumping Act of 1921, §§ 201-213, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1978).
See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
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state owned or controlled enterprises, the percentage of ap-
praisements subject to the "related parties" test will grow. Both
types of transactions provide a basis for questioning and possibly
going beyond transaction value, although much movement of mer-
chandise between "related parties" is at arms length and
therefore will remain subject to transaction value under the new
code. For those importers dealing with a state controlled enter-
prise or in a "related parties" relationship which affects the price
of the merchandise, the new code offers relatively little, since a
full panoply of alternatives to transaction value remains for those
cases. A definition of "assists" which narrows Customs' ability to
add to dutiable value and the dispute settling mechanism will be
the main benefits for such traders. The dispute settlement provi-
sions of the code are at a government-to-government level and will
prove slow and expensive for importers. There is hope that in the
future a customs-to-customs or, better still, an exporter-, or
importer-to-foreign customs mechanism will be negotiated and in-
stalled to provide access to a dispute settlement mechanism for
private parties and reduce the time required for resolution, with
subsequent reduction of uncertainty and risk. It should also be
noted that as much as half of United States imports have entered
duty-free in recent years. As a result of the MTN duty reductions,
this portion will increase significantly. Remaining duties, which
will be cut, will further reduce the importance of duties. Because
valuation problems are associated primarily with payment of duty,
the valuation exercise will become less and less important
through time.
The standards code,' tested against uncertainty and risk, for
the most part appears to be beneficial to importers despite its
limited application. Only national government standard-setting
bodies are required to adhere. Even then there are numerous ex-
ceptions, and only a "best efforts" commitment to extend compli-
ance to state and local administrations is required. Clearly,
greater transparency of both standards and standard-setting pro-
cedures and the opportunity for appeals will benefit importers. It
must be noted that as the code is moving through Congress, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will be considering rules estab-
lishing a rigorous system to regulate standard-setting procedures
of private bodies. Efforts are being made by the FTC to coor-
dinate its proposed rules with the criteria established by the in-
' See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
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ternational code. Here again, uncertainty and risk will be reduced
by the MTN agreement and the FTC rules because importers and
foreign producers will have an opportunity to participate in the
standard-setting procedures and will have avenues of appeal if
denied certification or approval of their products.
The Code's requirement of a central registry of standards will
of itself remove an important area of uncertainty. Importers for
the first time will be able to determine quickly and easily whether
a standard exists for their product and will be able to obtain a
copy of the standards expeditiously. Unless other action is taken,
however, the current problem of dispersed standards administra-
tion will be intensified by adoption of the MTN code and the FTC
regulations. Responsibility for product standards now lies in
numerous agencies, including the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission (CPSC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (BATF) and others. Even similar standard requirements
are shared by separate agencies; for example, country of origin
and other marking requirements are administered by Customs
while technical marking may be the responsibility of FCC or FDA
and labeling may fall to FTC, CPSC or others. Transportation
standards are in the province of Department of Transportation
(DOT). Ironically, the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) and the
Department of Commerce has little impact on imports at present,
but it is likely that adoption of the code and regulations will
enhance their role. (Problems exist in the FTC proposals for
standard-setting bodies and certifying groups, but any discussion
of such defects is beyond the scope of this article.)
There is little doubt that the codes themselves will benefit im-
porters despite numerous and sometimes serious drawbacks, in-
adequacies and exceptions. The primary direct benefit will be a
reduction of uncertainty and risk. Secondary benefits will lie in
the immediate impact of reduced duty rates, in standardized, ex-
pedited and simplified procedures, in enhanced dispute-resolution
mechanisms, and in greater transparency in the establishment of
trade barriers.
IV. A WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: WHAT THE MTN BEGAN,
WILL U.S. IMPLEMENTATION IMPAIR?
Perhaps the greatest benefit for all traders, including im-
porters, lies in the fact that the sophistication of debate over a
[Vol. 9:207
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world trading system has been raised several notches by these
agreements. The "floor" of what is acceptable in this area has
been elevated so that future disputes and problems will be ad-
dressed on higher levels under a new set of accepted assumptions.
Although least quantifiable in benefit, this aspect of the MTN pro-
vides the heart of the achievement. We can now, for the first time,
talk of a world trading system.
Still, we cannot be sanguine about U.S. implementation of the
codes. The Administration, in its fear that protectionist pressure
will result in congressional disapproval, has yielded to virtually
every demand to increase the burden on importers and ease the
tests and obligations which must be met before trade restricting
actions can be taken. Powers to restrict, restrain or stop imports
are being enhanced. Domestic competitors and trade unions,
already familiar with the harassment potential of the mere filing
of complaints and appeals, will now be given greater access to all
procedures
Other proposals are even more damaging. Chief among these
are reductions in the time limits within which the government
must complete antidumping and countervailing duty cases-time
limits so short that not only will importers, foreign exporters and
foreign governments be unable to prepare adequate defenses, but
the government itself will not have time to conduct proper inves-
tigations. The resulting reliance on government averaging and
estimating and inadequate information are sure to result in in-
creased imposition of duties and harassment of imports. A pro-
posal to require deposits of cash or special single-entry bonds
after preliminary antidumping and countervailing duty determina-
tions has also been made. Basically this amounts to punishment
before trial. In addition to frequent governmental failures in the
past to protect confidential business information and a recent
Supreme Court decision" immunizing government from suits to
prevent information from being released under the Freedom of In-
Two such complaints were recently terminated for lack of injury when the ITC found
that in one case there had been no importations of the products in the most recent four
years, and in the other there had been only one small shipment per year. The ITC com-
mented in a case against certain gloves from Brazil that the petitioner expressed "no inter-
est" in the investigation. The cases, in short, were intended only to harass the importers
and exporters and to cause them concern and expense. See Wool Yarns from Brazil &
Uruguay, U.S. ITC pub. no. 940 (1979) and Certain Gloves & Glove Linings with Fur on the
Skin from Brazil, U.S. ITC pub. no. 941 (1978).
' Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979).
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formation Act, 9 proposals have been made to require defendants
in cases against imports to give information to complainants. It
should be noted that all parties (including trade unions and trade
associations) have access to the courts-where information can be
protected-in appeal of any government decision.
Among other congressional proposals is an old red herring, con-
version from an f.o.b. basis for valuation to a c.i.f. basis. Aside
from its use as a "bargaining chip," little merit can be seen in this
proposal from any perspective. If made trade neutral, it would
have no impact and would require extensive statistical manipula-
tion with ongoing revision and administration. If its purpose is to
obtain information, we are already collecting it in as good a form
as any. C.i.f. valuation has no effect as a protectionist device.
Finally, if it is imposed without compensation to exporting
governments and without averaging its impact in the United
States, it will be discriminatory, it will distort patterns of trade
and transportation and it will raise costs and prices unevenly.
Proposals also have been made to grant the President power
not only to impose an automatic import licensing scheme, but also
to auction quotas here in the United States. The only good thing
to be said about the latter proposal is that it does not cover quotas
set under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 0 which
includes textiles and footwear.
A 650-page compendium of the negotiated changes regarding
duty rate reductions,1 may not appear before mid- or late July.
Some nasty surprises for importers are expected. Although the
vast bulk of changes are reductions, their effects vary greatly,
and some rates actually will be increased. Conversion from spe-
cific and compound rates to ad valorem equivalents will produce
many higher rates, as will compensation for ending the American
Selling Price basis for valuation of footwear and chemicals. Some
higher rates reportedly have been negotiated on such items as insti-
tutional stoneware and certain stainless steel flatware. Further, a
project in which the interagency Committee for the Annotation of
Tariff Schedules (which is responsible for maintaining the Tariff
Schedules of the United States), would "clean up" the tariff sched-
ules is to be included. This will produce perhaps three thousand or
more changes in five and seven-digit tariff item descriptions and
numerous changes in duty rates, many of which would be in-
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1977).
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C. § 612(c) (1970).
See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
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creases.12
The implementing legislation, when finally introduced, probably
will contain many features presently secret. It is not known, for
instance, whether changes in the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences will be included. One possibility is that the annual effective
date for eligibility changes will be made later than March 1 and
that some minimum dollar limit will be established, below which
the 50% competitive need rule would not operate. In addition to
the codes, the agreements, and the implementing legislation,
numerous "side deals" reportedly also have been made. Their ef-
fects will not be known until they become visible at some time in
the future. The numerous protectionist concessions made between
the government and domestic industries, such as steel, textiles
and apparel, sugar, rubber, citrus, electronics and dairy products,
will all have negative impacts on trade and inflation-boosting im-
pacts on the economy.
V. CONCLUSION
It is nearly impossible to gauge the impact of changes in trade
on the importing community. Importers have dealt with adversity
for hundreds of years, have learned to profit from it, and have
learned-first and foremost-how to survive. However, im-
porters, and all traders, should benefit as the codes and agree-
ments negotiated in Geneva take effect. Chief of the benefits is
commitment to a world trading system, with guidelines for pre-
ferred behavior, strictures against general and specific acts
against trade, rules and standards for acceptable retaliation, and
standards for dispute settlement procedures. Protectionism and
nationalism will always be problems, felt most sharply in bad
" We cannot leave the subject of duty rates without raising, as an example of possible
future benefits of the MTN, the approaching time when trading nations will be able to
eliminate duties completely, except as a device for selective protection. Few nations still rely
on duties as a source of revenue, and that function will diminish as duty rates go down and
an increasing percentage of trade enters duty-free. If duties could be levied only as specific
protective rates, all current dispute over valuation would disappear, many classification
disputes would be ameliorated or would disappear, trade statistics would be far more valid
than at present, and protective rates would be highly visible and certain. Much of the con-
tention between Customs, exporters and importers would be removed; much of the pres-
ent paperwork and administrative effort would be reduced. Enforcement would be focused
on more serious problems of law infraction and a very different relationship between
traders and their governments would be possible.
" It is also true that except for total embargo, some importers will gain and profit from
every restriction on and impediment to trade, no matter how badly others are hurt. (The
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times. But during quiet times and strong economic periods, the
codes and agreements, will provide a basis for steady improve-
ment of subsidies to exports; instead there will be debate over the
acceptability of specific subsidies. No longer will standards be us-
ed for exclusion of foreign products; nations will argue instead
over exemptions. Further, the MTN has at least partially disarm-
ed what clearly would have been a worldwide protectionist attack
on trade greater than any since the Smoot-Hawley tariff exercise
of the Great Depression. In the short run, however, importers and
exporters will suffer from protectionist'anticompetitive implemen-
ting legislation in most nations. Other signatories are waiting to
see how the United States acts; we can expect their extended at-
tacks will not severely impede trade, but will make all merchan-
dise-whether foreign or domestic in origin-
more expensive and importing more burdensome until times im-
prove.
auctioning of quotas by the United States, which may appear in the implementing legisla-
tion, will allow large importers to gain at the expense of smaller ones. Profits may increase
through industry restraint in bidding up quota prices, and a new profitable business of
quota brokerage will appear.)
Because domestic industry does not really want to compete with imports in the mass
market, every price increase by importers as a result of trade restrictions traditionally is
met by a corresponding price increase by the domestic competition. The consumer pays
while both the importers and domestic interests pace their markup percentages on the
resulting higher prices and make more dollars. Restrictions on trade are invariably anti-
competitive. Those importers who survive appreciate the lessened competition as much as
their domestic counterparts and profit from it in the same ways.
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